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Abstract— Democratic rule is generally acclaimed as a 
better form of governance, but its operation does not 
appear to come cheap. This is especially so in Nigeria 
where new democratic dispensations are heralded by 
expensive electioneering campaigns. The funds for these 
campaigns are sourced from willing donors or through 
subtle coercion. Corporate organizations are easy prey to 
politicians. This paper is provoked by the frequency and 
blatancy with which corporate organizations in Nigeria 
donate to political parties and for political purposes 
without any sanctions despite the unambiguous 
prohibition in S.38 (2) of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA). This exposes the inability of the 
provision to halt or reduce this practice to the barest 
minimum and also reveals the unpopularity of the 
provision. The paper argued that it is not possible to 
completely extricate organizations from the political 
dynamics in their host committees and proffered some 
mitigating factors which will make the provision more 
acceptable to the people and more respected. The paper 
discovered normative reasons why the prohibition in S.38 
(2) of CAMA is largely ignored.It therefore recommended 
wide ranging amendments to the provisions so as to 
enhance compliance, improve its enforcement strategies, 
reflect present day realities and align it with international 
best practices. 
Keywords— Political Finance, Campaign Funding, 
Political Donations, Company Law, Electoral Act. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Funding is a critical component of political activities and 
without money it would be problematic for political 
parties to propagate their philosophies and agenda to the 
public and this will make it difficult for the electorates to 
be well informed and educated as to proper choices 
during elections. Expectedly, Political activities and 
campaigns in Nigeria and indeed in some other 
jurisdictions are usually accompanied by humongous  
financial expenditure. In Nigeria for instance, campaigns 
are organised as mini carnivals with enormous fanfare 
with each party doing it utmost to outdo and out spend the 
other. This is done with a view to impress the voters as 
though this could replace ideological discourse. The issue 
whether Nigerian political parties are ideologically based 
is not the focus of this paper, but it is interesting to note 
the comment by Oji, (2014) that: 
 Most parties in Nigeria lack ideologies 
and are not issue oriented, and rather 
they are manipulated by political 
entrepreneurs who invest on the parties 
and expect concurrent returns such 
investments.  
Political party activities and funding in Nigeria are 
usually associated with contemptible instances of 
corruption which comes in form of illicit funds, vote 
buying and manipulations. The devastating and saddening 
effects of these gifts led Thomas (2016) to rhetorically 
ask, “who is using their cash to possibly bend the ear of 
the future President?” It is for this reason that normative 
and institutional framework have been put in place to 
regulate political donations by companies thereby placing 
restrictions and limitations on political funding by 
corporate entities. Unfortunately and quite regrettably, the 
effort to regulate political donations and campaign 
financing is enforced more in breach than compliance. 
Many laws have been put in place in Nigeria including 
constitutional fortification on donations to political parties 
and campaign funding in other to guide and the operations 
of political parties and restrict their expenditure profile. 
The superlative law, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria as amended contains provisions that 
are designed and constructed to institutionalize probity, 
accountability and due process in the financial 
architecture of political parties. Section 225 sub sections 2 
of the 1999 Constitution in very unambiguous terms 
requires and obligates every political party to submit to 
the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) a 
detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of 
funds and other assets together with a similar statement of 
its expenditure in such form as the commission may 
International Journal of Advanced Engineering, Management and Science (IJAEMS)                     [Vol -4, Issue-12, Dec-2018] 
https://dx.doi.org/10.22161/ijaems.4.12.1                                                                                                                  ISSN: 2454-1311 
www.ijaems.com                                                                                                                                                                          Page | 787 
require. INEC is also given the authority under Sub-
section 5 of section 225 to give directions to political 
parties regarding the books or records of financial 
transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all 
such books and records.  
To further underscore the fundamental character of the 
provision relating to probity and accountability by 
political parties and the oversight responsibility of INEC, 
section 226 (1) provides that the Independent National 
Electoral Commission, shall in every year prepare and 
submit to the National Assembly a report on the accounts 
and balance sheet of every political party. Sub section (2) 
of the section further provides that: 
It shall be the duty of the commission, 
in preparing its report under this section, 
to carry out such investigation as will 
enable it to form an opinion as to 
whether proper books of account and 
proper records have been kept by any 
political party, and if the Commission is 
of the opinion that proper books of 
accounts have not been kept by a 
political party, the Commission shall so 
report. 
Again, the constitution mandates INEC to monitor and 
scrutinise foreign funding and donations to political 
parties in Nigeria. In Specific terms, the constitution in 
section 225  Sub sections 3, prohibits political parties 
from holding or possessing assets outside Nigeria or be 
entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it 
from outside. Sub section 4 of the same section states that 
any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political 
party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or 
transferred to the commission within twenty-one days of 
its receipt with such information as the commission may 
require. It is apparent from the above constitutional 
provisions that INEC should play a central role in 
checking the financial dealings and status of political 
parties and ensuring compliance to this constitutional 
obligation. It is in line with this constitutional philosophy 
and the need to regulate and limit political funding that 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act equally prohibits 
corporate entities from political donations. The utility and 
plausibility of this prohibition is not farfetched as such 
donations and gifts are subject to abuses and susceptible 
to corruption.  
Usually, fund raising ceremonies are organized by 
political parties to fund campaign extravaganzas. Both 
individuals and corporate organizations are expected to 
donate generously. At these ceremonies companies 
actually donate generously and publicly too. There is no 
gainsaying the fact that these are illegal donations 
according to S.38 (2) of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act. The section unambiguously prohibits any 
form of donation or gift to a political party, political 
association, or for any political purpose. For purposes of 
clarity the section states  thus: 
A company shall not have or exercise 
power either directly or indirectly to 
make a donation or gift of any of its 
property or funds to a political party or 
political association, or for any political 
purpose; and if any company, in breach 
of this subsection makes any donations 
or gift of its property to a political party 
or association, or for any political 
purpose, the officers in default and any 
member who voted for the breach shall 
be jointly and severally liable to refund 
to the company the sum or value of the 
donation or gift and in addition, the 
company and every such officer or 
member shall be guilty of an offence 
and liable to a fine equal to the amount 
or value of the donation or gift. 
It is pertinent to note that the proscription on donations 
and gifts by companies for political purposes as contained 
in Section 38(2) of CAMA is precise, all-encompassing 
and unequivocal, leaving no lacuna or opportunity for  
circumvention. For instance, the section prohibits 
companies from making such gifts or donations directly 
itself or tangentiallythrough a proxy or by representation. 
This means that a company may still be culpable even if 
such donation is made through delegation or even a 
Director or Shareholder. Again, the section creates a legal 
platform for lifting the veil of incorporation so as to 
directly hold the officers of the company or the members 
or both who took the decision to make the gift or 
donation. To underscore the ultimate appeal of the 
section, it also creates corporate and individual criminal 
liability.  
Sadly, this provision is observed more in breach by 
Nigerian companies, especially since the sanctions 
attached appear to be a cosmetic provision. This is made 
obvious by the fact that no company has been found 
culpable under the section in discuss despite the 
numerous instances of donations to political parties in 
fragrant breach of the law. This paper recognizes the fact 
that companies are profit making organisations and it 
makes good business sense to donate to a party envisaged 
to be strong enough to win the elections. The 
understanding behind these gifts need not be written 
down. There is usually an unmistaken, but unwritten and 
a non-contradictory pact between the giver and the 
receiver that such gifts will curdle and court 
governmental favours to the company when the recipient 
eventually wins. Otherwise, the question may be asked 
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why a profit making organization would give out its 
shareholders’ funds if it was not expecting good returns.  
In spite of the express prohibition, this provision is 
largely breached and treated with levity. It thus becomes 
compelling to ask why this is so and what could be done 
to make this provision more appealing or easier for 
companies to comply. Is an outright ban practicable in 
view of the fact that companies are expected to be good 
and interactive citizens in the environment within which 
they operate? Is it absolutely or inescapably necessary to 
bar companies from political interactions in view of the 
fact that they will be affected by governmental policies? 
This paper proposes to attempt answers to these questions 
in addition to suggesting some mitigating interventions 
which will most likely satisfy the yearnings of all and 
bring the law closer to the realities of our time. It is our 
believe that legislative provisions that are not rooted in 
the people’s beliefs and life style or legislative provisions 
that are too draconian and far from reality, will not enjoy 
the people’s respect.Even though this research is 
primarily doctrinal, it enjoys the benefit of diverse 
approaches including the comparative, analytical and 
evaluative. For all these, heavy reliance is placed on 
published materials such as books, journals, documents, 
reports, papers, communiqués, newspapers, etc. 
Additional materials are sourced from reliable internet 
sites. 
 
II.  MONEY IN POLITICAL ARENA  
Democracy the world over appears to be an expensive 
form of government. The institutionalization of 
democratic government is not cheap either. It is at this 
point that funds are needed for campaigns. In Nigeria for 
instance, the different political parties appear to side-line 
the purpose of campaigns and rather concentrate and 
compete with each other on the fanfare. Musicians, 
comedians and traditional dancers are paid to entertain the 
audience. Textile factories are paid to produce customized 
fabrics for each campaign. This aspect usually dominates 
the campaigns thereby over-shadowing and rendering 
insignificant, discussions on the parties’ ideologies and 
other important issues. This could be because the parties 
actually lack ideologies and are not issue based and so the 
fanfare is actually a diversionary ploy. However, these 
diversionary gimmicks cost money. This money must be 
sourced from different quarters and the companies are 
easy targets. The way out is for the Independent Electoral 
Commission to mandate the political parties to drastically 
reduce the fanfare and expensive extravaganzas and 
engaged the people more on ideological conversations.  
Right from the 1959 elections, individuals and companies 
funded the electioneering campaigns because the 1958 
Nigeria (Electoral Provisions) Order in Council made no 
provisions for governmental funding. The adverse effects 
of these gifts and donations by companies to political 
parties or associations is what prompted the insertion of 
S.38(2) into CAMA. Companies through such gifts “… 
bought the consciences of political leaders who will have 
no choice but to be amenable to their demands”  (Ekpo, 
2000). Accordingly, it exerted corrupting influences on 
political office holders resulting in over-valued contracts 
which were often times not executed. This contributed 
immensely to official wastefulness and poor management 
of public resources (Ikhariales, 1999).  
It was against this background that the Law Reform 
Commission concluded thus:  
 We are all witnesses to the abuses of 
political donations and gifts in recent 
political history. We think that no one is 
in doubt that there is need to plug this 
loophole for corruption and graft… It is 
intolerable for the funds and assets of a 
company in which every shareholder 
has an interest to be used to foster the 
interest of a political party in which 
some do not believe. We therefore 
recommend that a company should be 
deprived of the power to make 
donations or gifts to political parties or 
associations. 
 
Sadly, in spite of the adoption of the Commission’s 
recommendations, this practice is still going on 
unchecked and done as if it were legal. The prohibition in 
S.38 (2) is strengthened by S.221 of the 1999 Constitution 
which bans any other association other than a political 
party from sponsoring the election of a candidate. The 
Constitution in section 228 (c) rather authorizes the 
National Assembly to provide annual grants to the 
Independent Electoral Commission for disbursement to  
political parties. Flowing from the provisions of S.221 of 
the Constitution, a company, not being a political party is 
prohibited from contributing to the funds of a political 
party.  
Both Ss.38 (2) of CAMA and 221 of the Constitution are 
highly commendable in view of the mischief they set out 
to curb. However, this paper is worried by the provisions 
of section 90 of the Electoral Act 2010which expects a 
presidential candidate to spend a maximum of N200m, a 
Governorship Candidate to spend N100m, Senate, House 
of Representative and House of Assembly candidates to 
spend N40m, N20m and 10m respectively. These 
amounts according to section 90 (8) are exclusive of the 
amounts paid to pick up nomination forms or amounts 
paid for declaration of interest. The declaration of interest 
and the picking of nomination forms do not come cheap 
either, for instance, in the All  Progressive Congress 
(APC), a presidential candidate expresses his interest with 
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N5m and picks the nomination form with N40m while a 
governorship aspirant would pay N2.5m for expression of 
interest form and N20m for nomination form making it 
N22.5m. The amount is graduated down to the State 
House of Assembly as contained in the APC 2018 
Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for Public 
Office, APC National Secretariat, 2018.Effectively, a 
presidential candidate in APC is officially expected not to 
exceed N127,500,000m in his campaigns while a 
governorship candidates is not expected to exceed 
N205,500,000m in his campaign expenses. 
In an attempt to scale down the high cost of participation 
in politics, the National Assembly has reviewed the 
nomination fees downwards and made it uniform for all 
parties by including it in the bill to amend the electoral 
Act (Inyang, 2017). The Electoral Act No. 6, 2010 
(Amendment) Bill 2017, has made provision for the 
abolition of arbitrary fixing of nomination fees by 
politicalparties. It reduces the fee for presidential 
candidate to N10m, governorship, N5m, Senate 2m, 
House of Representatives N1m and House of Assembly, 
500,000. The high cost of participating in politics in 
Nigeria may discourage people who would have been 
interested but for financial constraints. The current 
Nigerian President MohamuduBuhari confessed that he 
was able to buy the APC nomination form with money 
borrowed from a bank through the help of a Bank 
Chairman (Adekunle, 2014).The question may be asked, 
why he had to go through a Bank Chairman if he was 
ordinarily qualified for a loan. This takes us back to 
companies and complicity in funding electioneering. 
Another issue that this raises is what would have 
happened to the loan if the recipient of such an arranged 
loan had not been successful. How would the loan have 
been paid back to the bank? This probably would have 
become another case of a non performing loan. 
Invariably, this is corporate sponsorship of a political 
candidate taking another coloration. 
As interesting and as well intentioned as these 
prohibitions may be; it is doubtful if the Federal 
Government of Nigeria can comfortably fund the current 
number as more political parties  have recently been 
registered. This is a continuous exercise we have well 
over 90  political parties and it may be impossible to fund 
them through appropriation by the National Assembly 
under S.228 of the Constitution. This is even more 
disturbing given the current economic recession in 
Nigeria. It must be emphasized here that the amounts 
expended byObasanjo, a former President of Nigeria for 8 
years and a huge beneficiary of corporate sponsorship for 
his elections is more than would have been needed to 
fight a successful war” (Obasanjo, 2003). This statement 
must be taken seriously since it was made by a retired 
General in the Nigerian army. The enormity of the 
situation also led an erstwhile Chairman of the 
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), Iwu to call 
for the taxing of such donations so as to discourage the 
practice. Jonathan, a former Nigerian President is widely 
reported to have raised over N21b from both corporate 
organizations and others for this 2015 elections. Taxing 
may generate funds to the federal Government, but it will 
not discourage the practice. Rather, it will encourage such 
donations to be made discretely. What can deter is 
enforcement of the sanctions attached to the law (Adetula, 
2015). 
However, S. 90 of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended in 
2011 gives INEC the power to limit donations to political 
parties. Accordingly, political parties are not expected to 
keep anonymous monetary contributions or gifts.In 
addition, S.93 (2) mandates political parties to “keep an 
accounts and asset book” where all contributions received 
in excess of N1m are recorded with names and addresses 
of donors. This is to assist the political parties in 
compiling their report on this to INEC after the 
announcement of election results. Unfortunately, there is 
no punishment in the section for none compliance. 
 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT QUAGMIRE 
In spite of the clear prohibition in S. 38(2) CAMA, gifts 
to political parties, politicians and political meddling by 
companies in Nigeria has continued unabated and may be 
said to be encouraged by those who ought ordinarily to be 
the custodians of the law in Nigeria. It can be asserted 
here without fear of contradiction that since the coming 
into effect of CAMA, all Nigerian Presidents and their 
political parties have benefited from corporate gifts for 
their campaigns. This is why this law is largely ignored 
by the Attorney-General who naturally is an appointee of 
the President. In 2000, Williams, berated the Attorney-
General (AG) of Nigeria for failing to prosecute Julius 
Berger for donating to the People’s  Democratic Party 
which was the ruling party in Nigeria then. He expressed 
the fact that every law should be law. The frustration in 
getting an unwilling AG to prosecute a criminal was 
witnessed by Nigerians in Gani Fawehinmi v. Akilu.This 
frustration in the lack of enforcement of S.38(2), led the 
petitioner in Obasango v. Yusufto seek the annulment of 
the election of Obasanjo on the grounds that he had a 
public fund raising ceremony for his elections where 
corporate organizations donated. Unfortunately, even 
though the court held such gifts to be illegal, it dismissed 
the suit for want of jurisdiction. 
Also, a breach of S. 38(2) is a classic case for a derivation 
action by a shareholder under S. 300(9) of CAMA. 
However, despite the frequency of breach, there is dearth 
in such reported cases. The question that may be asked 
here is why this is so? This paper posits that the answer to 
this may be multi-faceted. First, it may be that those 
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responsible for publicizing the law have failed to do so. 
Second, the shareholders see nothing wrong in supporting 
a political cause that may be beneficial to their company 
in the long-run. Thus, if a law is discountenanced by its 
custodians and the citizenry, it is time to revisit the law in 
order to enable it attend its desired objectives as well as 
enjoy the respect of all.  
Moreover, our laws should be dynamic and evolve with 
changing times in a globalised world. Sadly, the outright 
prohibition contained in S. 38(2) is reproduced as S. 37(2) 
in the bill to amend and replace CAMA which is currently 
pending at the Nigerian National Assembly. The danger 
in this is that, even if CAMA is eventually replaced this 
blanket prohibition, which is no longer trendy in other 
jurisdictions, it will still be a part of the Nigerian 
Company Law, even when it serves no practical purpose 
without enforcement.      
 
IV. PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM  
The problem of corporate intrusion into the political arena 
especially via campaigns funding is by no means a 
Nigerian phenomenon. These problems occur in other 
jurisdictions also, but the difference lies in the way this 
issue is treated in each jurisdiction.  
4.1 Corporate Donations in India  
In India, donations by companies to political parties and 
donations for political purposes have increased in recent 
times. It has been reported that such donations have risen 
to as high as 151% between 2014 and 2015 (Ghadha, 
2015). Within this period also, corporate organisations 
have been reported to contribute 90% of the total 
donations to political parties with the Bhartic group 
leading by donating a third of the funds needed by 
BharatiyaJanata Party (B.J.P.). This increase may be 
because an outright prohibition against political donations 
by corporate had been abolished with the exception of 
government companies and companies which have not 
existed for up to three years.  
Now by S. 182(1) of the 2013 Indian Companies Act, 
companies apart from the two groups earlier mentioned, 
can donate for political purposes. Such contributions are 
not expected to exceed 7½% of the company’s  average 
net profit in the past three years. This must also appear in 
the company’s annual accounts. This has to be done with 
the authorization of the company’s board of directors 
through a resolution.  
It is interesting to note that donations for genuine 
charitable purposes can be made by the board of directors. 
However, by S. 181 of the Indian Companies Act 2013, if 
the amount to be donated exceed 5% authorisation of the 
general meeting before the gift can be made.Political 
donations by companies are expected to be reflected in 
the company’s profit and loss account for the period. It is 
intriguing to note that while political donations need the 
boards’ approval, that for charitable purposes which 
exceed 5% of the company’s net profit needs  the approval 
of the shareholders. Could this have been dictated by the 
need to take expeditions decisions on the issue? This 
paper submits that the shareholders interest is best served 
if both are made to receive shareholders’ authorization.  
Irrespective of the above observation, the Indian position 
is far better than the blanket ban in Nigeria. The Indian 
Act recognizes the need for companies to interact with 
their communities, since they could be adversely affected 
if they remain aloof and a bad government is elected into 
power. A breach of this law attracts punishment for both 
the company and its officers. Upon breach, the company 
may be made to pay a fine which may be five times the 
amount contributed, while its officers are liable to the 
same fine and in addition to an imprisonment for up to six 
months as contained in S. 182 of the Indian Companies 
Act.This law is more likely to be obeyed because it 
creates leverage for compliance unlike S. 38(2) of 
CAMA. 
4.2 Political Donations under the English Companies 
Act 2006 
Under the English Companies Act 2006 elaborate 
provisions are made on this issue. Part 14, comprising of 
17 sections is dedicated to it. Definitions of the phrases, 
political donations, political parties, political 
organisations and political expenditure are clearly given 
sections 363, 364 and 365. These definitions are absent in 
CAMA. One therefore has to resort to some other 
legislation for the meanings of these phrases in Nigeria. 
The English Act demonstrates a clear and serious 
intention to place things in their proper perspectives 
devoid of ambiguities.  
By Ss. 367 and 368, an ordinary resolution of members is 
all that is required to authorize the directors to make such 
donations. Also, S. 368 expects the authorisation to last 
for four years unless the articles or the directors determine 
that it should be for a shorter period. The authorizing 
resolution must set a monetary limit. A breach of these 
provisions renders the directors jointly and severally 
liable to refund the amount in issue with interest to the 
company. In addition, they are bound to compensate the 
company for any loss or damage incurred as a result of 
the breach. Interestingly, these provisions may be 
enforced by a group of members holding not less than 5% 
of the companies share value or not less than 50 of its 
members or 5% of members of the company, if the 
company is not limited by shares. This is of course 
limited to the conditions contained in S. 371 of the Act.  
It should be stressed here that this paper favors 
authorization to make political donations through a simple 
resolution of members as contained in S. 367 of the 
English Act as opposed to a situation where the board 
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authorizes itself as contained in S. 182 of the Indian Act. 
In the latter case, the board may whittle away 
shareholders’ funds to further the political ambition of 
their members. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper set out to assess the effectiveness or otherwise 
of the prohibition in S. 38(2) of CAMA, expose the level 
of compliance with a view to proposing some mitigating 
parameters which may most likely improve the 
compliance level. The paper considered the historical 
antecedents of this prohibition and noted the mischief it 
was meant to curb, it also noted that this mischief still 
exist in present day Nigeria. The paper realized that there 
tend to be general apathy towards enforcement by both 
the shareholders and the Attorney-General. The paper 
therefore concluded that this is an indication of the 
unpopularity of the law. It surmises that the practice of 
corporate donating for political purposes have become so 
entrenched that it has become normative in Nigeria.  
This however is encouraged by the ignorance of 
shareholders as those who ought to enlighten them have 
failed to do so for obvious reasons. This paper therefore 
concludes that the frequency, blatancy and even tacit 
approval of this practice does not derogate the fact that 
this practice is offensive to the spirit behind the enactment 
is S. 38(2) of CAMA and therefore, something ought to 
be done to encourage compliance.  
This article also took a cursory look at the manner of 
electioneering campaigns in Nigeria and decried the lack 
of ideologies and issue based campaigns. It observed that 
the diversionary fanfare campaigns are more expensive 
and therefore should be discouraged. This will reduce the 
cost of campaigns and also the pressure on companies to 
donate and in addition enable more descent people with 
lean purses to aspire to political positions. A perusal of 
relevant provisions of the Electoral Act and the APC 
Guidelines for Nomination of Candidates revealed 
humongous amounts the candidates are expected to spend 
during their campaigns. This paper therefore concludes 
that this will rather encourage a breach of the prohibition 
in S. 38(2) of CAMA and neither can Nigeria in its 
present economic quagmire adequately fund the present 
number of political parties in the country.  
Unfortunately, while CAMA’s sanctions in S. 38(2) may 
be said to be mere paper tigers for lack of enforcement, 
the provisions in S. 93 of the Electoral Act can be said to 
be a toothless bull-dog for lack of punishment for breach. 
S. 93 would have greatly assisted CAMA if it provides 
punishment for its breach. The provision on corporate 
donations for political activities in India and the United 
Kingdom was examined. It was discovered that these two 
jurisdictions have abandoned the outright proscription in 
favour of provisions which rather regulate such donations. 
This is a better and more practicable approach than the 
ban in S. 38(2) of CAMA.  
It is important to re-emphasis here that the new Act being 
envisaged to replace CAMA will serve no useful purpose 
in the modernization of CAMA on this issue as the 
provisions in S. 38(2) has simply been repeated as S. 
37(2). Invariably, when and if the law comes into effect, 
Nigeria will continue to lag behind the rest of the world 
on this issue. 
Flowing from the above, the following recommendations 
are considered apposite.To nib this problem in the bud, 
the Electoral Act should have new provisions which will 
reduce the influence of money in electioneering 
campaigns. The parties should be made to base their 
campaigns on relevant issues  and not on side attractions 
which cost money. There is need therefore to amend S. 90 
of the current Electoral Act so as to reduce the maximum 
monetary expectations of candidates for campaigns. This 
in effect will reduce the desperation and the tendency to  
pressurize campaigns for assistance.  
S. 38(2) of CAMA is in dire need of amendment. It 
should be amended so that companies apart from 
government owned companies can donate out of their net 
profit. The Act needs to specify the percentage of the net 
profit for the year which cannot be exceeded. The 
approval to do so should be given to the board by the 
members. Such donations should be well recorded and 
should reflect in the company’s  annual accounts. The 
record should indicate the political party or the political 
cause to which the money is donated. There should be 
robust enforcement framework to deter breach.  
The Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission should be 
properly funded and staffed so as to perform its regulatory 
functions in companies effectively. The Electoral Act 
should be amended so as to include provisions which 
disqualify candidates who receive gifts from corporations  
in breach of the amended S. 38(2). Enforcement of the 
civil and criminal sanctions attached to the provisions in 
CAMA should be taken seriously.  
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